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I.

BIOGRAPHY

Justice Sonia Sotomayor was born on June 25, 1954 in the Bronx. 1 Her mother,
Celina, was previously enlisted in the Women’s Army Corps as non-combat personnel, a
position that brought her from Puerto Rico to the United States mainland. 2 At the time of
Justice Sotomayor’s birth, her mother had recently completed the General Education
Development (GED) test and was working as a telephone operator at Prospect Hospital in
the South Bronx.3
Justice Sotomayor’s father, Juan, was also a Puerto Rican who migrated to the
mainland during the war. 4 He worked in a tool-and-die factory, did not speak English,
and only had a third-grade education.5
Shortly after Justice Sotomayor’s birth, her mother began studying to be a
licensed practical nurse (LPN), and her parents made plans to move out of their tenement
apartment into a public housing project in the Bronx. 6 At age 3, Justice Sotomayor and
her parents moved into the Bronxdale Houses, a housing project in the Soundview section
of the South Bronx. 7 Justice Sotomayor recalls the newly constructed housing project as
the cleanest apartment she had ever seen, and she was overwhelmed that it would be her
new home. 8 At the time, housing projects like the one that Justice Sotomayor had just
moved into were respectable working-class homes that were well-kept, affordable,
spacious, and family friendly.9
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At around the same time Justice Sotomayor’s family mo ved into this housing
project, her younger brother, Juan Luis Jr. was born. 10 At this time, her mother was now
working as an LPN at Prospect hospital. 11 Justice Sotomayor described her mother as
strongly self- motivated, and she taught Justice Sotomayor and her brother that education
could allow you to accomplish any dreams.12
Justice Sotomayor’s parents did not want to send their children to public school,
so both Justice Sotoamyor and Juan Jr. to Blessed Sacrament, an excellent private school
near their home.13 In order to afford this, Celina worked extra hours at the hospital.14
During the weekends, Justice Sotomayor spent a lot of time with her extended
family. 15 Her cousins, aunts and uncles would often meet in the home of her paternal
grandmother to enjoy Puerto Rican dishes, play games, and dance. Justice Sotomayor
recalls that her “Latina soul was nourished.”16 Her family would also picnic on the Long
Island Sound and attend Yankee games.17
At age 8, Justice Sotomayor was diagnosed with type 1 diabetes. 18 Prior to her
diagnosis, diabetes often made Justice Sotomayor tired, quiet and uninterested in
school. 19 One diagnosed, the treatment improved her lifestyle and changed her behavior
greatly, allowing her to feel like a child. 20 However, at that time, diabetes was thought to
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lower life expectancy and lead to other health problems. 21 This discouraged Justice
Sotomayor and deeply impacted her approach to her goals as a young adult.22
A year after Justice Sotomayor’s diabetes diagnosis, her father, at age forty-two,
died from a heart attack. 23 After Juan’s death, Celina moved the family into a smaller
apartment in the same housing project. 24 Her mother was stricter with the children and
would not allow Justice Sotomayor to play with friends until after her homework and
chores were done. 25 Justice Sotomayor enjoyed reading Nancy Drew books and wanted to
become a detective. 26 However, she was told that this career would be too stre nuous for
someone with diabetes. 27 Even at age eight, Justice Sotomayor was disappointed and
upset that she did not have an established career plan. 28 She began watching Perry
Mason, and she became inspired to become a lawyer. 29 Justice Sotomayor has said, “I
was going to college and I was going to become an attorney, and I knew that when I was
ten.”30 While watching Perry Mason, Justice Sotomayor was especially impressed with
the Judge’s role, and she liked how the judge had the power to dismiss a case and how
the lawyers had to ask to judge for permission to do anything.31
Sometimes, Justice Sotomayor would spend her days in a sweatshop with her
aunt. 32 Her aunt was a seamstress, and Justice Sotomayor would go to work with her
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when no one else was available to baby sit. 33 She said that she would be confined in a
room with blacked out windows and little ventilation, and her aunt would chase her away
from the windows because, unaware to her at time, the undocumented seamstresses were
hiding from the police.34
During the 1960’s, the South Bronx grew into a more dangerous place. 35 Justice
Sotomayor would often have to protect her younger brother from bullies, muggers and
bike thieves. 36 Her brother recalls her as watching over her, being very strong willed and
confident and “tough as nails.”37 Around this time, Justice Sotomayor began working her
first part time job at Zaro’s Bakery, which was about 10 blocks from her home. 38 At age
fifteen, she began working at a large retail store called United Bargains. 39 Commuting
around the Bronx became more dangerous with armed gangs and drug dealers. 40 By the
end of the 1960’s, the Bronxdale Houses became an unsafe place to live, and Celina
began looking for a new place to move her family. 41
Justice Sotomayor finished the eighth grade with the highest grades in her class.
She took the Catholic High School entrance exam and enrolled at Cardinal Spellman
High School in 1968. 42 It was one of the top high schools in the city and was located
about five miles north of the Bronxdale houses.
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approximately 90% white. 44 Justice Sotomayor earned a reputation as o ne of the top
scholars at the school.45
In the end of 1970, the worsening condition of the South Bronx reached a peak.46
Gang violence and drugs were out of control, and landlords were burning down
tenements and apartment buildings in order to collect insurance money. 47 Celina moved
her family to Co-op City, a new project in the northeast section of the Bronx, whic h had
opened two years earlier. 48 This was considered a middle class section of New York, and
Celina bought a two bedroom apartment. 49 From her new home, Justice Sotomayor had a
fifteen minute bus ride to Cardinal Spellman High School50
While Justice Sotomayor was a junior in high school and her brother was a
freshmen, Celina decided she needed to become a registered nurse in order to support
herself in the future. 51 She enrolled in the RN program at Hostos Community College in
the South Bronx. 52 As a result of Celina’s enrollment in school, she could not work as
many hours at the hospital. 53 In order to make up for the lost income, Justice Sotomayor
and Juan spent more hours working on weekends and during summer vacations, and
Justice Sotomayor also began working at the hospital. 54 Celina also spent more time
working on the weekends, but still had to take out loans and depend on the part time jobs
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of her children for help. 55 Justice Sotomayor said that it was no sacrifice for her at all to
take on extra work in order to help her mother go back to school. 56
While working at the hospital, Justice Sotomayor was exposed to the extremely
poor population that the hospital catered to. 57 It taught her about the suffering that went
on in the city and how hard her mother had to work to move the family from the South
Bronx.58
During Justice Sotomayor’s senior year of high school, she participated in school
government and the debate team. 59 She also met Kevin Noonan, another student who was
known for being very smart and having a bright future. 60 Although Justice Sotomayor
now had a boyfriend, she did not let this distract her from her classes, debate meets or
work with the Latino organization ASPIRA.61
In 1972, Justice Sotomayor graduated high school and delivered the valedictory
address after winning a speech competition, as opposed to holding the highest grade in
the class. 62 Justice Sotomayor left the Bronx to attend Princeto n University but she
explains that the media is “woefully misleading” when is describers her as coming from
“humble beginnings.”63 She explains “that despite economic hardship, it was not hard
[…] to succeed because [she] had the example and guidance of a truly remarkable
woman, [her] mother.”64
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Justice Sotomayor acknowledges that she was accepted into Princeton University
based on affirmative action, but her entering class of only 1,127 included only 22 Latino,
15 Chicano, and 113 black students.65
Justice Sotomayor recalls secluding herself in the dorm room during her early
weeks at Princeton and being both overwhelmed and confused by her new
surroundings. 66 Justice Sotomayor also struggled with academics at first. 67 During her
first semester, she received a C on a midterm paper, and she realized her writing was not
good. 68 Justice Sotomayor recalls that although she always excelled in her academic work
prior to Princeton, her education did not compare to her colleagues, and she felt a huge
divide between herself and her WASP counterparts. 69 Justice Sotomayor worked closely
with all of her professors to close that gap, and improve her writing and grammar skills
and reading comprehension. 70 Eventually, her motivation produced great results, and she
began writing better and gaining confidence in herself.71
Eventually, she joined

the Puerto

Rican student organization,

Acción

Puertorriqueña, and an activity center for minority groups called Third World Center.72
Justice Sotomayor says that these groups helped her to remain grounded in the unfamiliar
environment.73
Justice Sotomayor became cochair of Acción Puertorriqueña, and in 1974, she
decided to file a complaint with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
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(HEW) charging Princeton with a lack of commitment to hiring Puerto Rican and
Chicano administrators and faculty and recruiting Puerto Rican and Chicano students. 74
The complaint said that Princeton’s affirmative action plan did not specify goals which
were provided for other minority groups, that their attempts to recruit qualified Latinos
consisted of contacts with only one foundation and one Chicano student, that Princeton
did not even try to contact Latino organizations, and that no Princeton course focused on
Puerto Rican or Chicano culture. 75 Originally, Justice Sotomayor felt that Princeton was
“following a policy of benign neutrality.”76 However, a month later, Justice Sotomayor
followed up with a letter to the Daily Princetonian, and alleged that Princeton had an
institutional pattern of racism.77
Following the complaint, Princeton authorized a new class on Puerto Rican
history and politics and made more efforts to recruit Latino faculty. 78 While at Princeton,
Justice Sotomayor also started a program for students to volunteer as translators at the
Trenton Psychiatric Hospital so that Spanish-speaking patients could communicate with
doctors and staff.79
During her senior year, Justice Sotomayor wrote her senior thesis on Luis Muñoz
Marin, former leader of the Popular Democratic Party in the Puerto Rican senate and the
first elected governor of Puerto Rico, and the consideratio n of Puerto Rican
independency.

80

Her thesis received an honorable mention from the History
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Department. 81 She was also awarded the M. Taylor Pyne Prize, which is given to one or
two seniors each year who show excellence in academics, leadership and being a
responsible citizen.82
During the summer of 1976 after her graduation from Princeton, Justice
Sotomayor married her high school boyfriend, Kevin Noonan. 83 That fall, he began
working on a Ph.D. in molecular biology at Princeton, and she headed to Yale Law
School.84 They ultimately divorced.85
At Yale Law School, Justice Sotomayor cochaired a club called the Latin, Asian,
and Native American Students Association (LANA). 86 Justice Sotomayor was part of a
diverse group of friends, and she recalls that, “We worked hard, we studied hard, we
partied very hard.”87
During her second year at Yale, Justice Sotomayor worked as a salesperson at the
Graduate-Professional Student Center on campus. 88 Thereafter, she was a summer
associate at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. 89 During her third year, she
worked in the law school’s mimeo room.90
Also during her third year, Justice Sotomayor attended a recruiting dinner held by
the Washington law firm, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge. 91 During the dinner, a
partner from the firm asked her a series of questions about minorities and their credentials
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to work in firms and affirmative action. 92 Justice Sotomayor found these questions to be
discriminatory, and she filed a complaint against the firm and urged Yale to terminate the
firm from their recruiting program. 93 Ultimately, the firm wrote an apology letter to Yale
Law School because word had spread to other law schools and bega n to mar the firm’s
reputation.94
After graduating from Yale Law School in 1979, Justice Sotomayor worked as an
Assistant District Attorney in New York City until 1984. 95 As a prosecutor, Justice
Sotomayor said that she would not prosecute a case she didn’t believe in, and she always
had an impulse to keep both sides in mind. 96 She thereafter worked as an associate and
partner at Pavia and Harcourt in Manhattan until 1992. 97 During her first few days on the
job, Justice Sotomayor overheard another litigation associate refer to her as “one tough
bitch.”98
In 1991, President George H.W. Bush nominated her to the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York, where she served from 1992 until 1998. 99 She was the
first Hispanic person to be appointed to the federal bench in New York. 100 President Bill
Clinton nominated her to the United States of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where she
served from 1998 until 2009. 101 On May 26, 2009, President Barack Obama nominated
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her as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. 102 Democrats unanimously supported
her confirmation; 103 however, she particularly faced criticism from Republicans for a
comment she made in 2001 at a lecture at the University of California, Berkeley where
she said “I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences
would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived
that life.” 104 Nonetheless, on August 6, 2009 she was confirmed as a Justice of the
Supreme Court by a 68-31 vote. 105 She was sworn in August 8, 2009, and she became the
first Hispanic and the third woman to serve on the Supreme Court. 106
II.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’S JURISPRUDENCE: CANDID, FACTSPECIFIC, NARROW, FAIR AND FORWARD LOOKING

Justice Sotomayor’s personal experiences and legal career prior to becoming a
Justice have both influenced her opinion writing and decision- making. Justice Sotomayor
recognizes the effects that a Justice’s personal experiences may have on his or her
viewpoints. In reference to her fellow Justices, she has pondered, “What’s the human
experience that they’ve had that has led them to some of the choices that they made in
our jurisprudence?” 107 Specifically, in reference her and Justice Scalia’s differing
opinions, she has pointed out that,
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[i]t’s a simple fact that he advertises repeatedly: Justice Scalia in high
school used to carry his rifle on the train to go do his rifle club things.
Sorry, target shooting and stuff. He and I both come from a city, but his
views of the Second Amendment have been very different than mine. Our
experiences on the same issue were very different, and knowing that fact
about him has given me an insight into where his well of passion springs
from. And it’s not useful on outcomes, necessarily. It is useful in knowing
what cases to take or not take for cert, and how to vote, when you’re
reviewing cases. And thinking about what the possible outcomes are. 108
Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor finds importance in sharing these personal
experiences. 109 “I hope my candor about myself as a person would permit others to be
more introspective about themselves and more hopeful about themselves.” 110 She also
urges involvement from society, “participate, find your nook. You don’t have to be a
lawyer, but you have to be an involved person. You have to care enough about things to
do something about them… What you cannot do is ignore things.”111 Justice Sotomayor’s
desire for everyone to have a fair chance, a voice, and her focus on facts is evident in her
opinion writing.
Her experience as a prosecutor also taught her to form rules of law and decide
cases on a very fact specific basis. 112 “[B]road absolute rules don’t really suit me,” she
has stated, because while prosecuting criminals, she learned to be very sensitive to facts
in order to preserve the record so that that her prosecutorial victories would not be
108
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reversed. 113 Additionally, Justice Sotomayor likes to make fact specific rulings because
she is always looking to the future and weary of how a holding may impact future
cases.114
She also focuses on fairness when deciding a case. She has pointed out that “[she]
can’t control the outcomes of cases,” but she “can live with that if [she] perceives the
process to be fair.”115
A. Majority Opinions
Justice Sotomayor authored the majority opinion in J.D.B. v. North Carolina.116
In that case, the Court had to decide whether police should consider a suspect’s age in
determining whether their questioning warrants the Miranda warning, which is required
only during a custodial interrogation. 117 Whether a suspect is in custody in an objective
inquiry and requires an examination of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation
and whether a reasonable person would feel free to end the interrogation and leave.118
The petitioner, J.D.B. was a 13-year-old seventh grader who was removed from
his classroom by a uniformed police officer, taken to a closed-door conference room, and
questioned by the police for 30 to 45 minutes. 119 The school’s assistant principal and
administrative intern were also present. 120 This was the second time that the student was
being questioned within the span of a week in connection with two home break- ins
because he was seen behind one of the homes where the crimes occurred, and police
found one of the stolen items, a digital camera, in the school, and it had been seen in
113
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J.D.B.’s possession. 121 Before his questioning in the school, neither the police nor the
school administrators contacted J.D.B.’s guardian, his grandmother. 122 He was not given
a Miranda warning or the opportunity to speak with his grandmother. 123
The police officer confronted J.D.B. about the stolen camera, and the assistant
principal urged him to “do the right thing.”124 The officer told J.D.B. that he could be sent
to juvenile detention, and he confessed to the break- ins. 125 Thereafter, the officer
informed J.D.B. that he could refuse to answer questions and that he was free to leave.126
However, J.D.B. continued to provide further information about the crime. 127
After J.D.B. was charged with two juvenile petitions alleging breaking and
entering and larceny, his public defender moved to suppress his statements because he
was “interrogated by police in a custodial setting without being afforded Miranda
warning[s].” 128 At the suppression hearing, the trial court denied the motion, and the
North Carolina Court of Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court both affir med,
holding that J.D.B. was not in custody when he confessed. 129 These courts did not find
that age should be a factor when considering whether or not a suspect is in custody. 130
The Supreme Court disagreed and remanded the case for the state courts to
determine whether J.D.B. was in custody, this time considering his age at the time. 131 In
her majority opinion, Justice Sotomayor recognized the inherent pressures of custodial
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interrogation, but emphasized the issue when it came to juveniles. “A reasonable child
subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a
reasonable adult would feel free to go.” 132 She argued that this commonsense conclusion
should be “self evident to anyone who was a child once himself, including any police
officer or judge.”133 She pointed out that the law takes age into consideration in many
different areas and explained, “that children cannot be viewed simply as miniature
adults.”134 The Court held that “so long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the
time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable
officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that
test.”135
In her opinion, Justice Sotomayor faced the question head on and rejected the idea
that taking a child’s age into consideration would taint the objectivity of the custody test
used for administering a Miranda warning. Much of her opinion is focused on the idea
that children, far more so than adults, are subject to the psychological and physical
pressures of a custodial isolation. Justice Sotomayor’s personal experiences shine through
in the opinion because she, as a young person, often felt isolated. After she was first
diagnosed with diabetes, Justice Sotomayor recalls being withdrawn and quiet. 136
Additionally, she remembers being confined in a sweatshop while her seamstress aunt
babysat her, and she was too naïve to realize that she was disallowed from going near the
windows because the undocumented workers were hiding from the police. 137 Similarly,
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although she was a young adult at the time, Justice Sotomayor felt very isolated when she
first entered Princeton University. 138 It is clear that, as Justice Sotomayor mentioned in
her opinion, these memories from her childhood and younger years influenced her
decision that children do not have the confidence or maturity to protect themselves when
an adult normally would. This is in line with Justice Sotomayor’s introspective and
candid judicial approach.
Justice Sotomayor also wrote the majority opinion in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano. 139 In that case, the Court had to decide whether a plaintiff can bring a claim
for securities fraud under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 when a pharmaceutical company failed to disclose
reports of adverse events associated with a product when the reports did not find a
statistically significant number of adverse events. 140
Investors in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. brought a class action suit against the
company alleging that Matrixx, in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
and SEC rule 10-b(5), did not disclose that Zicam, a cold remedy medication that earns
the corporation 70% of its profit, may cause a patient to lose her sense of smell. 141 There
were reports from three medical professionals and researchers about more than 10
patients who lost their sense of smell after using Zicam and one patient who experienced
severe burning in his nose followed immediately by loss of sense o f smell. 142
Furthermore, two consumers had already sued Zicam for that same reason.

138
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Nonetheless, Martixx issued statements that Zicam was “poised for growth in the
upcoming cold season” and that the company “had very strong momentum.” 144 They also
predicted that revenues would be up in excess of 50% and that earnings per share would
be about 25 to 30 cents.145
After Dow Jones Newswires reports that the Food and Drug Administration was
looking into complaints about cold medicine manufactured by Matrixx, the stock fell
from $13.55 to $11.97 per share. 146 However, three days later, Matrixx issued a press
release stating that Zicam is manufactured and marketed according to FDA guidelines
and that there has been no clinical trial with a single report of Zicam causing a loss of
smell. 147 The stock thereafter increased to $13.40 a share. 148 However, three days later,
Good Morning America reported on a study where more than one dozen patients lost
their sense of smell after using Zicam. 149 The price for Matrixx fell to $9.94 per share.150
In order to prove their allegations, the investors had the burden to show that there
was a material misrepresentation or omission by the corporation, that there was scienter,
that there was a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase
of the security, that there was reliance on the misrepresentation or omissio n, that there
was economic loss and that there was loss causation. 151 Matrixx argued that the investors
failed to prove both that there was any material misrepresentation or omission and that
there was scienter. 152 Matrixx argued for bright-line rule that would find that their

144

Id. at 1316.
Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
145

18

M. Samir Behary
omission was not material because the number of patients who lost their sense of smell
was not statistically significant.153
The District Court ruled in favor of Matrixx and found that the plaintiffs failed to
plead the elements of a material misstatement or omission and scienter. 154 They found
that the plaintiffs did not allege a “statistically significant correlation between the use of
Zicam and anosmia so as to make failure to public[ly] disclose comp laints and the …
study a material omission.” 155 Similarly, they found that plaintiffs did not state with
particularity facts that proved scienter. The Court of Appeals reversed. 156
In affirming the Court of Appeals in a unanimous decision for the Court, Justice
Sotomayor held that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded the element of a material
misrepresentation or omission and found that there was scienter.

157

She rejected

Matrixx’s bright line rule that a study must be statistically significant for it to be a
material omission. 158 Instead, she found that “assessing the materiality of adverse events
reports is a fact specific inquiry.”159 She pointed out that “statistically significant data are
not always available” because sometimes an adverse event is “subtle or rare” or ethical
considerations prevent some studies that may find statistically significant data. 160
Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor found that there was scienter and rejected the inference
that the Matrixx did not report the information because they did not know it was
significant. 161 Instead, she pointed out that Matrixx likely did not report the information
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because they knew it would have a negative impact on their stock prices.

162

She

explained that they must have known of the harmful effects of Zicam because they hired
a consultant to review the product, asked a medical researcher to participate in animal
studies, convened a panel of doctors and scientists in response to a presentation a nd study
that Zicam was harmful and asked the presenter to refrain from using the corporations
and product name in his presentation. 163
First, this opinion is in line with Justice Sotomayor’s style of opinion writing
because she rejected a bright line rule that would use the statistically significant test in
deciding whether or not an omission was material. Justice Sotomayor prefers a specific
finding that looks at facts of the case instead. This is inline with the approach that she
learned during her time in the District Attorney’s office. Additionally, in her reasoning,
Justice Sotomayor pointed out reasons why a bright line statistically significant test
would not work. 164 In pointing out that such data is not always available to shareholders,
she showed her appreciation for fairness and recognized that it would not be fair to
require shareholders to allege statistically significant data when such data is not always
possible.165
Justice Sotomayor also authored the majority opinion in Mohawk Industries, Inc.
v. Carpenter.166 In that case, the Court had to decide, “whether disclosure orders adverse
to the attorney client privilege qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order
doctrine.” 167 The collateral order doctrine gives federal courts of appeals jurisdiction to
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review prejudgment orders that are collateral to the merits of an action and too important
to denied immediate review.168
In Carpenter, Norman Carpenter, a shift supervisor at Mohawk manufacturing
facility, notified human resources that the company was employing undocumented
immigrants. 169 The company directed him to meet with the company’s counsel that they
had retained for a pending class-action suit for conspiring to drive down the wages of its
legal employees by hiring undocumented workers in violation of federal and state
racketeering laws. 170 At the time, Carpenter was unaware of the pending class action
suit. 171 After meeting with the counsel, Carpenter claimed that they tried to convince him
to recant his statements, and after he refused, he was fired. 172
During discovery in his lawsuit against Mohawk, Carpenter filed a motion to
compel Mohawk to produce information about his meeting with their attorneys and the
reasons for his termination. 173 Mowhawk refused, claiming that the requested information
was protected by the attorney-client privilege.174
The District Court agreed that the information was privileged, but compelled its
disclosure, finding that Mohawk waived the privilege through its representations in the
pending class-action suit. 175 The court denied certification for an interlocutory appeal, but
stayed its ruling so that Mohawk could explore other ways to appeal. 176 Thereafter,
Mohawk filed a notice of appeal and a petition for a write of mandamus to the Eleventh
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Circuit. 177 They dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the District Court’s order
did not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. 178
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. In her majority opinion, Justice
Sotomayor looked to the precedent Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 179 to
explain that “an order is appealable if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed
question; (2) resolves; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from final
judgment.” 180 Justice Sotomayor pointed out that collateral appeals have an adverse effect
on trial court efficiency and the administration of justice. 181 She found that the types of
appeals permitted under the collateral order doctrine must remain narrow and selective,
and that adverse attorney client privilege rulings did not fall into this category.182
This opinion is typical of Justice Sotomayor because it shows her preference for
narrow rules since she did not want to expand the class of rulings that are eligible for a
collateral appeal. This was also Justice Sotomayor’s first opinion, and although this is not
a major case for the Court, Justice Sotomayor used this opinion to her advantage because
it is the first time that the Court used the term “undocumented immigrant” as opposed to
“illegal immigrant” which appeared in many other opinions. 183 Although this is not part
of her decision, it shows Justice Sotomayor’s preference for everyone to get involved and
have a voice. In her first opinion as a Supreme Court Justice, she took the opportunity to
change a term that she presumably finds harmful to undocumented residents of the
United States.
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Justice Sotomayor also wrote the majority opinion in Michigan v. Bryant, 184
where the Court had to decide whether the Confrontation Clause barred the admission at
trial of a shooting victim’s statements to police. 185 Police were dispatched to a gas station
in Detroit where they found Anthony Covington lying on the ground next to his car with
a gunshot wound to his abdomen. 186 He was in great pain and barely able to speak. 187
When the police asked him what happened, who shot him and where the shooting
occurred, he told police that “Rick” shot him about 25 minutes prior at Richard Bryant’s
house through the door of the home after they had a conversation. 188 Mr. Covington was
transported to the hospital where he died within hours. 189 After arriving at Mr. Bryant’s
house, the police found blood and a bullet on the back porch and a bullet hole in the
door.190 Mr. Covington’s wallet and identification were also outside the home. 191 At Mr.
Bryant’s trial, the officers testified about what Mr. Covington told them before he died,
and the jury found Mr. Bryant guilty of second degree murder, being a fe lon in
possession of a firearm and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. 192
Mr. Bryant argued that the statements to the police were testimonial and therefore
inadmissible and the State argued that they were excited utterances, admissible under the
Michigan Rules of Evidence.193
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and the Supreme Court
of Michigan remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals, which again affirmed,
184
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holding that the statements were not testimonial. 194 After Mr. Bryant appealed to the
Supreme Court of Michigan again, they reversed his conviction. 195
In Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion, the Court found that the statements were
not testimonial because they had the primary purpose of assisting the police with an
ongoing emergency.

196

Justice Sotomayor found that “objectively ascertaining the

primary purpose of the interrogation by examining the statements and actions of all
participants is … most consistent with … past holdings.” 197 In order to reach the
conclusion that the investigation’s primary purpose was to assist with an ongoing
emergency, she considered the fact that the police knew nothing about the shooting when
they arrived at the scene, a gun was involved, the police were unsure if there was a
greater threat to the general public and the informality of the interrogation. 198 This
approach is consistent with Justice Sotomayor’s pre ference for fairness and fact-specific
holdings. She wanted to consider all the circumstances, presumably so that she could
reach a fair result that was limited and relied only on the facts presented. Even though
Justice Scalia dissented, he still found fairness in Justice Sotomayor’s approach; “The
only virtue of the Court's approach (if it can be misnamed a virtue) is that it leaves judges
free to reach the “fairest” result under the totality of the circumstances.”199
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B. Concurring Opinions
Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in U.S. v. Jones. 200 In that case, the
Court has to decide whether the attachment of a Global-Positioning-System (GPS)
tracking device to a person’s vehicle and the use of the device to track the vehicle’s
movement on public streets constituted a search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. 201 The Government installed the GPS on the undercarriage of a car
registered to Antoine Jones’ wife while it was parked in a public lot. 202 The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia issued a warrant that authorized the
installation within 10 days because Jones was suspected of trafficking narcotics. 203 The
Government tracked the car’s movements for 28 days, and Jones was ultimately charged
with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more
of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine base. 204
Jones filed a motion to suppress, and the District Court granted the motion in part,
suppressing only the data obtained while his vehicle was parked in the garage next to his
residence. 205 They held that the data obtained at other locations was admissible because a
“person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his movements from one place to another.” 206 A jury found him guilty, and
he was sentenced to life imprisonment. 207 The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction, finding that “the admission of the
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evidence obtained by warrantless use of the GPS… violated the Fourth Amendment.”208
In a majority opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that the
Government’s installation of the device and the use of the device to track the car’s
movements did constitute a “search.” 209 As opposed to focusing on a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia’s opinion focused on
how the “Government trespassorily inserted the information gathering device.” 210 The
physical trespass test for a search had not been used by the Co urt in recent years, but
Justice Scalia found that the test was never eliminated either.

211

The “reasonable-

expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common- law
trespassory test.”212 Furthermore, Justice Scalia found that the reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test could not be used in this case to affirm the Circuit Court’s reversal of the
conviction because the Supreme Court already held in U.S. v. Knotts213 that a person does
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when traveling on public roads.214
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor recognized that the Government’s physical
intrusion on Jones’ Jeep constituted a search. 215 However, she found that “it may be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”216
This concurrence is typical of Justice Sotomayor’s desire for fairness and her
habit of looking into the future to assess how a current holding may have later impact.

208

Id. at 949.
Id.
210 Id. at 952.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 952.
213 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983).
214 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 957
209

26

M. Samir Behary
Justice Sotomayor noted that the physical trespass test is not suited for today’s
technological advances because, for example, smartphone are now equipped with GPS
devices that are installed either by the factory or by the owner, but may be used by police
to track personal whereabouts. 217 She pointed out that this type of monitoring could
expose a person’s familial, political, professional, religious and sexual associations.218
Despite established law that public movements are not subject to a reasonable expectation
of privacy, Justice Sotomayor believes that this principle requires reconsideration
because of fairness. In a discussion as Yale Law School, Justice Sotomayor stated that:
there are moments when you understand that the consequence of stare
decisis so burdens another side, so unfairly deprives them of something
that is really critical to the system that you’re examining, that you have to
decide to change existing precedent or else continue what you view as an
injustice.219
Thus, although Justice Sotomayor respects current law, her goal to achieve fairness and
her ability to foresee future problems with current Supreme Court holdings could
outweigh even the doctrine of stare decises.
Justice Sotomayor also authored a concurring opinion in Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, where the Court had to decide whether the introduction of a forensic laboratory
report through the testimony of a scientist who did not perform or observe the test was a
violation of the Confrontation Clause. 220
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Donald Bullcoming was arrested for driving while intoxicated after he rear-ended
another vehicle in Farmington, New Mexico. 221 He refused to take a Breathalyzer test,
and the police thereafter obtained a search warrant for a blood alcohol analysis and sent
the blood sample for analysis. 222 At trial, the prosecution called an analyst who was
familiar with the laboratory’s test procedures, but who did not participate or observe the
testing on Bullcoming’s sample.

223

The lab report also contained a testimonial

certification, and the scientist who appeared in court with the forensic laboratory report
was not the same scientist who signed the certification. 224 They could not call the analyst
who actually performed the test because she was on unpaid leave for an unexplained
reason.225
The New Mexico Supreme Court found that although the blood alcohol analysis
was testimonial, it was not a constitutional violation because the testimony of the other
analyst was enough to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. 226 In a
majority opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court reversed. 227 They found
that a testimonial out of court statement cannot be introduced at trial unless the witness
who made the statement is unavailable and the accused was previously able to confront
the witness. 228 The Court held that the forensic report was testimonial and that, in order to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause, the prosecution would have to call the scientist w ho
actually performed the test.229
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Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurrence where she agreed that the state ments were
testimonial and that their introduction violated the Confrontation Clause. 230 However, she
wrote separately to emphasize the limited reach of the Court’s opinion.

231

She

emphasized what the case was not about. 232 She wanted to point out that this case was not
about a situation in which, and the holding would not apply to a situation in which, the
State suggested an alternate purpose for the forensic report, the person testifying was a
supervisor, reviewer or someone else with even some connection to the forensic report, or
an expert witness who was asked for an independent opinion about underlying
testimonial report that were not themselves admitted into evidence. 233
This concurrence keeps inline with Justice Sotomayor’s preference for narrow and
fact specific opinions. Although she agreed with the Court, she wanted to make sure that
the limited reach of the opinion was clear. Additionally, it shows how Justice Sotomayor
has an ability to look into the future and be weary of how a current holding may be read
into future cases. She predicted that the three mentioned situations may be litigated using
Bullcoming is precedent, and she wanted to make it clear that the holding did not apply.
C. Dissenting Opinions
Justice Sotomayor authored a dissent in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action, et al.234 In that case, the Court had to decide whether an amendment
to Michigan’s constitution, which prohibited state universities from considering race in
the admissions process, was invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
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Amendment to the United States Constitution. 235 This amendment was approved and
enacted by Michigan voters. 236 The Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration
and Immigrant Rights, Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), and
students, faculty, and prospective applicants to Michigan public universities challenged
the amendment. 237 The District Court granted summary judgment to Michigan, and the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment. 238
In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth
Circuit and held that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit voters from enacting an
amendment to the Michigan constitution that prohibited affirmative action in public
education or employment. 239 The Court made sure to point out that they were in no way
prohibiting affirmative action, but explained that voters in the States may opt out of using
race as a consideration for admissions to public universities. 240 The Court distinguished
this case from precedents that involved state laws that had the “serious risk, if not
purpose, of causing specific injuries on account of race.” 241 The court found that,
alternatively, this Michigan law just denied “the grant of favored status to persons in
some racial categories and not other.”242
In a dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor emphasized the United
State’s “long and lamentable record of stymieing the right of racial minorities to
participate in the political process.”243 She pointed out that, for example, states still tried
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to deny minorities the right to vote even after the Fifteenth Amendment was passed. 244
She argued that the Court always intervened in the past, when, for example, Texas tried
to prevent racial minorities from participating in primaries 245 or when Oklahoma tried to
require all voters to pass a literacy test.246
She also found that this holding took the power away from voters since the
admissions policies of Michigan’s public universities were previously decided by each
institution’s board which are nominated by political parties and elected by the citizens. 247
She argued that minorities fought long and hard to persuade these boards to adopt
affirmative action, and this amendment undid their efforts. 248 She argued that for any
other issues regarding admissions to a public university, supporters may lobby the elected
board of the institution, but for supporters of affirmative action, they must now seek to
amend Michigan’s constitution.249
It is not surprising that Justice Sotomayor emphasized the importance of the
political process doctrine and the necessity of letting the people have a voice. During
both her undergraduate and law school studies, Justice Sotomayor spoke out against
racism and discrimination by filing a comp laint against Princeton for their lack of Latino
and Chicano courses, faculty and students and by fighting for an apology from the law
firm that questioned her abilities as a minority and product of affirmative action. 250 She
experienced first hand the changes that can be made when minorities have a say.
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Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor’s strong stance against prohibiting affirmative
action is likely a direct result of her experiences in education. She acknowledges that she
was accepted into both Princeton and Yale Law School as a result of affirmative action,
and she doesn’t believe that affirmative action results in minorities that are less qualified
being accepted into school.

251

She explained at a Practicing Law Institute panel

discussion,
I am a product of affirmative action. I am the perfect affirmative action
baby. I am a Puerto Rican born and raised in the South Bronx from what is
traditionally described as a socio-economically poor background. My test
scores were not comparable to that of my colleagues at Princeton or Yale,
but not so far off the mark that I wasn’t able to succeed at those
institutions. But if we had gone through the traditional numbers route of
those institutions it would have been highly questionable whether I would
have been accepted with my academic achievements in high school. I was
accepted rather readily at Princeton and equally as fast at Yale. But my
test scores were not comparable to that of my classmates and that’s been
shown by statistics there are reasons for that, there are cultural biases built
into testing. And that was one of the motivations for the concept of
affirmative action, to try to balance out those effects. 252
This, it is clear how Justice Sotomayor’s personal benefits from affirmative action
played a part in this dissenting opinion, and she likely finds that her candor in sharing
these experiences will inspire others.
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Justice Sotomayor also dissented in Berghuis v. Thomkins,253 where the Court had
to decide whether a suspect waived his right to remain silent during a police
interrogation. 254 In that case, Van Chester Thompkins was interrogated in a small room
for three hours in relation to a shooting that happened about a year prior. 255 The detective
gave Mr. Thompkins a Miranda warning and asked him to sign a form saying that he
understood his rights. 256 Thompkins declined to sign the form, but the detective claimed
that Thompkins verbally confirmed that he understood his rights, although Thompkins
disputed this. 257 During the interrogation, Thompkins never said that he wanted to remain
silent, that he did not want to speak with the police or that he wanted an attorney. 258
However, he remained mostly silent during the entire three hours, giving a few limited
verbal responses such as “yeah,” “no,” and “I don’t know” and nodding his head. 259 He
also declined an offer to have a peppermint and commented that the chair he was sitting
in was hard. 260 Eventually, the detective began asking Thompkins if he believed in God
and prayed to God. 261 After Thompkins answered, “yes,” the detective said, “Do you pray
to God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?” 262 Thompkins answered, “yes,” but
refused to make a written confession, and the interrogation thereafter ended. 263 He was
charged with first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder and other
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offenses related to firearms. 264 He moved to suppress the statements, arguing that, at
interrogation, he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and the police
should have stopped the interrogation immediately, that he didn’t waive his right, and
that the statements were involuntary. 265 The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and
the jury convicted him of all charges, sentencing him to life in prison without parole. On
appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals found that Thompkins did not invoke his right to
remain silent. 266 He filed a petition for writ of habeus corpus in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, but that court also rejected his claim that he
invoked his right to remain silent. 267 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed, explaining that a waiver of the right to remain silent does not need to be
expressed, but can inferred from the actions and words of the suspect, and that he
invoked this right by remaining silent for the first two hours and 45 minutes of the
interrogation.268
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that since Thompkins answered the
detective’s questions about believing in God, he waived his right to remain silent despite
the fact that he remained silent for almost three hours prior to that.269
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that Thompkins invoked his right to
remain silent by sitting tacit for nearly three hours except for a few one-word responses
and that the government did not carry its burden of sho wing that he waived this right.270
She recognized the force behind a Miranda warning and its significance in protecting a
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suspect’s right against self- incrimination and pointed out the heavy burden that rests on
the government to prove that a suspect waived his rights. 271 She found that the majority
opinion ignores the important interests behind Miranda and that requiring a suspect to
unambiguously invoke this right counter intuitively requires the suspect to speak. 272 This
opinion is line with Justice Sotomayor’s judicial approach because she focused on
procedural fairness in explaining the government’s heavy burden and taking the right to
remain silent very seriously.
Justice Sotomayor also dissented in Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting.273
In that case, the court had to decide whether the federal Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA), which preempts “any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions
(other than through licensing or similar laws) upon those who employ … unauthorized
aliens” 274 preempted the Legal Arizona Workers Act, an Arizona statute that provides
that the licenses of state employers that knowingly or intentionally employ authorized
aliens may be, and in certain circumstances must be, suspended or revoked. 275 The
Arizona law also requires that every employer use the E-Verify system to very the
employment eligibility of the employee. 276 The E-Verify was created by Congress and
allows employers to verify the work authorization status of employees via the internet.277
Under the Arizona law, the state attorney general or county attorney should
respond to complaints about an employer hiring unauthorized workers by verifying the

271

Id.
Id.
273 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
274 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2).
275 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1972.
276 Id.
277 Id.
272

35

M. Samir Behary
employee’s work authorization status with the Federal Government, notifying the Federal
Government and then bring an action against an employer.278
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States and business and civil rights
organizations filed suit against Arizona, arguing that the Arizona law’s provisions which
allow suspension and revocation of business licenses are expressly and impliedly
preempted by the federal law, and that mandatory use of the E-Verify system was
impliedly pre-empted.279
The District Court ruled in favor of Arizona because they found that the plain
language of the pre-emption clause in the IRCA allows states to impose licensing
conditions on businesses within that state. 280 They also found that, although use of the EVerify system is optional at the federal level, Congress did not express any intent to
prevent states from making use of the system mandatory. 281 The Court of Appeals
affirmed.282
In the majority opinion written by Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court held that
IRCA did not pre-empt the Arizona law because, based on the plain language of the
Federal Statute, Arizona’s law falls squarely within the licensing exception within
IRCA. 283 Furthermore, the Court found nothing in IRCA that prohibited a state from
requiring use of the E-Verify system.284
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor argued that the Arizona law does not
fall within the licensing exception of IRCA because the exception should be read to allow
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a state to impose licensing sanctions only after the Federal Government finds that an
employer knowingly hired an unauthorized worker. 285 She also found that Arizona’s law
requiring mandatory use of the E-Verify system is pre-empted because the state
effectively made a decision for Congress, ignoring Congress’s policy objective in making
the E-Verify system optional.286
In her reasoning, Justice Sotomayor explained that licensing sanctions exist in
other laws in many different forms. 287 “Some permit authorities to take action with
respect to licenses upon finding that a licensee has engaged in prohibited
conduct…Other, more narrowly, permit authorities to take such action following a preexisting determination by another authorized body that the licensee has vio lated another
provision of law.”288 Justice Sotomayor found that the narrower form was necessary in
this situation so that the Federal Government can be the one to make the determination if
a worker is unauthorized and enforce the provisions of the IRCA against the employer. 289
She explained that under the IRCA, the Attorney General designates a specialized federal
agency unit whose primary duty is to prosecute violations of the IRCA. 290 Thereafter, the
Attorney General must provide the employer with notice and an opportunity to be heard
by a federal administrative law judge. 291 Justice Sotomayor pointed out that under the
Arizona law and majority holding, state courts will be adjudicating questions about work
authorization. 292 “[S]tate decisions – made by prosecutors and courts with no or little
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experience in federal immigration law – will rest on less-than-complete or innacurate
information.”293
In this dissent, Justice Sotomayor again shows her preference for narrow
holdings. When faced with deciding between the broad or narrow form of license
sanctioning laws, she chose the narrower version. In this way, she again showed her
preference for fairness because she was concerned that those accused of violating IRCA
would not have a fair process in court because they can be sanctioned based on a decision
made by a state court and argued by a state prosecutor, neither of which is experienced in
hearing or arguing cases about immigration law.
Justice Sotomayor also wrote a dissenting opinion in Perry v. New Hampshire.294
In that case, the Court had to decide “whether the Due Process Clause requires a trial
judge to conduct a preliminary assessment of an eyewitness identification made under
suggestive circumstances that were not arranged by the police.” 295 This type of
assessment is ordinarily required in cases where an identification is made under improper
police influence.296
In Perry, officer responded to an apartment building parking lot after receiving a
call that an African American male was breaking into cars. 297 After her arrival, Officer
Nicole Clay heard what she described as a metal bat hitting the ground and found Perry
standing between two cars, holding two car-stereo amplifiers. 298 Soon after, Alex Clavijo
approached the officer and told her that his neighbor woke him up to tell him that she saw
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someone break into his car. 299 Upon inspection of his car, Mr. Clavijo found his rear
windshield shattered and the speakers and amplifiers of his car stereo were missing. 300
While Perry stayed in the lot with a second officer, Officer Clay went inside the
apartment building to speak with the neighbor who called the police. 301 When the officer
asked for a description of the man she saw breaking into cars, she responded that he was
a tall, African-American man roaming the parking lot and looking into cars. 302 When the
officer asked for a more specific description, the neighbor “pointed to her kitchen
window and said the person she saw breaking to Clavijo’s car was standing in the parking
lot, next to the police officer.”303 Upon this identification, Perry was arrested. 304
After being charged with theft and criminal mischief, Perry moved to suppress the
identification based on due process, arguing that, even though the police did not arrange
the suggestive circumstances of the identification, a reliability assessment must be made
anytime an identification is made under suggestive circumstances. 305 The trial judge
denied his motion, and the jury convicted him of theft. 306
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, held that “the Due
Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry when the identification was
not procured

under

unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law
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enforcement.” 307 The Court found that due process is triggered only by police use of
unnecessarily suggestive procedures, whether or not the suggestion is intentional. 308
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the “Court has long recognized
that eyewitness identifications’ unique confluence of features – their unreliability,
susceptibility to suggestion, powerful impact on the jury, and resistance to the ordinary
tests of the adversarial process – can undermine the fairness of the trial.” 309 She found it
improper to only consider these concerns when police arrange the suggestive
circumstances. 310 She pointed out that the policy behind these assessments is based on the
inherent reliability problems with witness identifications, and she found no reason for
distinction between intentional and unintentional suggestion. 311 “At trial, an eyewitness’
artificially inflated confidence in an identifications accuracy complicates the jury’s task
of assessing witness credibility and reliability. It also impairs the defendant’s ability to
attack the eyewitness’ credibility.” 312 “Whether the police have created the suggestive
circumstances intentionally or inadvertently, the resulting identification raises the same
due process concerns. It is no more or less likely to misidentify the perpetrator. It is no
more or less powerful to the jury. And the defendant is no more or less equipped to
challenge the identification through cross examination or prejudiced at trial. The
arrangement- focused inquiry thus untethers our doctrine from the very evidentiary
interest it was designed to protect, inviting arbitrary results.”313
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This opinion is consistent with Justice Sotomayor’s focus on fairness because she
sought to look past the majority’s inquiry into police involvement or police intention, and
instead focused on the effects that the majority holding will have on defendants. She
focused on the inherent reliability issues in witness identifications and found that a
defendant still suffers from the same severe prejudice caused by witness identification,
whether or not the police created the suggestive circumstances surrounding it.
III.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Justice Sotomayor’s life experience and time spent as a prosecutor
taught her to rule in a narrow and fact-specific way. She also has a strong focus on
fairness, likes to be candid about her personal experiences and predict how a current
holding may impact future situations. This judicial approach is apparent in Justice
Sotomayor’s opinions.
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